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Joseph Simon Gallieni (1849-1916)
Marshal Gallieni's long and varied career was primarily that
of an empire builder in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, although
he is probably best known as the military governor of Paris and the hero of the
Marne in 1914. Starting his career as a second lieutenant in the Franco-Prussian
war, Gallieni entered the colonial service soon after his release as a prisoner
of war; his first overseas post was on the island of Réunion. Subsequent
colonial duty included West Africa, Martinique, Indochina, and reached its climax
in Madagascar, where he served as governor-general from 1896 to 1905. This tall,
spare, bushy eyebrowed, and mustachioed leader spent the last eleven years of his
life in France as comwebmander of armies and as a member of the supreme war council.
Recalled to active duty as military governor of Paris at the beginning of World
War I, Gallieni's alert, restless, ascetic, and bespectacled figure presented a
striking contrast to his portly and placid fellow meridional Joffre. Gallieni's
last service for France was as minister of war, a position from which he resigned
for reasons of health shortly before his death.
During his colonial career Gallieni put forth a number of concepts that were important
not only for those areas he comwebmanded, but also in the development of French colonial
thought—particularly through the application of these concepts by his disciples,
the most famous of whom was Hubert Lyautey. Gallieni was an administrator who favored
the idea of association, which called for collaboration and cooperation between
the French and the native peoples. Two other policies are even more directly associated
with him, namely, the tâche d'huile, or “oil spot,” and la politique
des races. The oil spot technique was a means of pacifying an ever broader area
around a center of control by making use of the native peoples. Gallieni employed
this technique in West Africa and Indochina and perfected it in Madagascar. La
politique des races, also perfected in Madagascar, called for commonsense administration
adjusted to the conditions and the needs of the particular region and its people.
Joseph Simon Gallieni was born at Saint-Béat, just north of the Spanish
border, on April 24, 1849, the son of Gaiëtan Gallieni and Françoise
Perissé. His father, who left Lombardy to avoid service in the Austrian
army, had enlisted in the French army, serving from 1829 until his retirement in
1860. It was while he was in command of a frontier garrison that he met and married
Françoise Perissé and, after his retirement, he returned to Saint-Béat
to become a wine-grower and local magistrate under the Second Empire and the Third
Republic. Joseph was thus a product of sturdy mountaineer, provincial, and military
traditions associated with austere morality, hard work, sense of duty, and intense
patriotism.
At the age of eleven Gallieni left home to attend the Prytanée de La Flèche,
a military school for the sons of soldiers, in preparation for Saint-Cyr. The distance
from home and the difficulties and expense of travel meant that the young Gallieni
was removed from his family except for the long vacation during the month of October
and that the instructors took the place of his parents. These professors tended
to be Voltairean rationalists, often critical of the Second Empire, and they influenced
their young student not only in his development of a rigid self-discipline but
also in his attitude toward religion and politics. It was also here that Gallieni
formed a number of lifelong friendships with fellow students who, though sons of
soldiers, did not follow a military career. Many schoolmates later entered the
theater, the arts, and literature, which may account in part for Gallieni's wide
circle of non-military friends 1.
In 1868 he graduated from La Flèche and entered Saint-Cyr. An indication
of Gallieni's sentiments at the age of nineteen is given by his entrance composition,
which was an attack on the ancien régime, especially the period of Louis
XV, and a glorification of the patriotism of the revolution. Gallieni was known
throughout his career as a republican general, in contrast to many of his monarchist
colleagues. When he served on the supreme war council between 1908 and 1914, he
was one of only two or three members labeled “republicans.” 2
A hard-working student at both La Flèche and Saint-Cyr—ranked about
in the middle of his classes at both schools—Gallieni chose the colonial
infantry, or marines, while at Saint-Cyr. Although love of adventure and, after
the Franco-Prussian war, a desire to escape from the humiliation of defeat are
the usual reasons given for his choice, the fact that Gallieni was a métis—Italian
and Catalan, republican in sympathy, and not at the top of his class—146th
in a class of 275—may have had some influence on his choice of the marines,
the least highly regarded of the services.
When the “class of Suez” was assigned to duty on July 14, 1870, Gallieni
joined the Third Marine Division as a second lieutenant, and it was in this capacity
that he took part in the battle of Sedan, assigned to the so-called Blue Division
fighting at Bazeilles against the Bavarians. His regiment held off the enemy for
an entire day with such intensity that, when they were finally forced to surrender,
the Bavarians threatened reprisals and were deterred only by one of their own officers.
Slightly injured, Gallieni claimed that he and his nineteen comrades, all that
remained of the regiment, were not a part of the surrender of Sedan 3. His letters
to his family at this period have a sort of “all is lost save honor” quality
about them, and he had the painful satisfaction of being received by General von
der Tann and congratulated along with his commanding officer, Major Lambert.
As a prisoner, Gallieni was detained at the fortress of Magdeburg and then, after
the armistice, was allowed to reside in Neuburg, Bavaria, with the family of a
professor. During this period of almost seven months, he set to work studying the
German people, their customs and history, a mode of dealing with foreign settings
that he adhered to in his colonial career. He also learned German and eventually
was able to speak and write the language fluently. This interest in languages is
shown by the daily journal he kept between the years 1876 and 1879, written in
German, English, Italian, and even some Latin, entitled Erinnerungen of My Life
di Ragazzo. He later learned Spanish, and added African and Asian languages during
his tours of duty on those continents. Gallieni admired the German people, whom
he considered “as good if not superior” to the French and more law-abiding.
In this period he was very critical of French politicians and journalists, Napoleon
III, and the lack of organization in the French army; and his republicanism was
again revealed by his delight at the proclamation of the Third Republic 4.
In March 1871 Gallieni was released to return to France and was reassigned to the
marines at Rochefort-sur-Mer, but he was looking forward to service overseas, and
in April 1872 he departed for the island of Réunion, where he remained until
June 1875. It was while he was on this assignment that he was advanced to the rank
of lieutenant in April 1873. Réunion was not an exciting station, but it
gave Gallieni time for study and his first contact with the tropics. He also had
his first indirect contact with Madagascar since French settlers and missionaries
sometimes came to Réunion, especially during periods of trouble on the greater
island. But eager for a more active life, Gallieni was able to get a transfer to
the tirailleurs sénégalais and returned to France in 1875. After
the usual period of rest and service at home, he departed for Dakar in December
1876.
During this stay in France Gallieni began his remarkable daily journal. This record
was undoubtedly useful for the perfection of his knowledge of languages and for
the organization of his thoughts on various subjects. It reveals the wide range
of interests of the young lieutenant—German history, military organization,
African geography, music, and poetry—alongside lighter, personal passages.
The journal shows Gallieni to have been a warm and friendly young officer, quite
in contrast to his deliberately cold and austere manner, a pose enhanced by his
physique, which gave him the appearance of a figure from El Greco 5. A fellow officer
who served with Gallieni at this time described his colleague as complex, meditative,
withdrawn, serious, and reserved, but with fits of gaiety, unhappy at social gatherings,
an untiring worker whose government duties were not enough and who used his free
time to study all subjects especially military topics and languages.
The new assignment in Senegal was not immediately demanding or interesting and
may explain Gallieni's journal notations in which he speculated on the possibility
of leaving the army for the consular service, where his knowledge of languages
would be useful 6. Illness, such as yellow fever and shingles, did not improve
the situation, but Gallieni's spirits and career were about to take a turn for
the better. In April 1878 he was promoted to the rank of captain, but, more important,
he came to the attention of the governor of Senegal, Louis Brière de L'Isle,
a colonial activist who wanted to complete the expansionist projects envisioned
by Louis Faidherbe during his terms as governor in 1854-1861 and 1863-1865.
Brière de L'Isle's plans called not only for the control of trade between
Senegal and the Niger but also for the construction of a railway, which required
territorial command of the area ruled by the Sultan Ahmadou of the Tukulor empire.
This task was to be given to Gallieni, who was appointed political director of
Senegal in January 1879 and in August was sent on a political and topographical
mission to the upper Senegal, where French control ended at Médine, a place
that Faidherbe had saved from a Tukulor attack in 1857. This first mission was
a reconnaissance to establish good relations with the tribes opposed to the Tukulors
and to found a post at Bafoulabé. At this period many Frenchmen, including
Gallieni, believed that it was necessary to move quickly in order to prevent the
British from taking over the Sudan commercially and politically. The French were
also faced with the problem of the Tukulor empire-whether to cooperate with it
or to encourage its enemies and sow discord among its vassals. In his own account
Gallieni shifts from one policy to the other, but his reports show that his original
aim was opposition to the Tukulors 7.
By 1880 the railway project was moving forward and it was necessary to take action.
In February of that year, about a week after the Gallieni expedition to the Niger
left Saint-Louis, Admiral Jean Jauréguiberry, minister of the navy, laid before
the French Chamber of Deputies a proposal for a railway from Dakar to the Niger 8.
The survey of the route thus became one of the major objectives of the expedition;
but other duties included gaining permission for the construction of forts at Fangala
and Kita, and the signing of protectorate treaties with the local tribes. Various
treaties were signed with local chiefs culminating in the treaty of Kita, April 25,
1880, which placed considerable emphasis upon commercial operations. Celebration
of the signing included native dancing, which the young and somewhat puritanical
captain found indecent.
, the capital of Sultan Ahmadou, was Bamako
on the Niger, and Gallieni chose the more direct but dangerous route through hostile
Bambara country. At Dio the mission—which consisted of 5 French officers,
160 native troops, and over 300 pack animals—was ambushed and suffered serious
losses, for the sultan. Under such conditions Gallieni might have been expected
to retreat, but he decided to continue. He believed retreat whould have an adverse
effect, especially in those areas in which the French had recently come as protectors.
The reception of the mission by Ahmadou was perhaps more scornful than hostile.
Gallieni's position was weak and the Tukulor sultan had reason to distrust the
French, who were cooperating with his enemies and building forts while attempting
to reach an agreement with him. Instead of allowing the mission to enter Ségou,
it was stopped a few miles away at the village of Nango in June 1880 and kept waiting
there for the next ten months. Despite Gallieni's repeated complaints and promises
of military assistance, the French were held as virtual captives in uncomfortable
and unhealthy conditions. Not until late in October did Ahmadou begin negotiations
through his minister, Seydou Djeylia, and on November 3 the treaty of Nango was
signed. Both sides gained and lost by the agreement. The French got a protectorate
to forestall what they believed was a British threat, as well as commercial and
navigation rights; the Tukulors got arms for use against their African opponents.
Gallieni was pleased With the results of his diplomacy but the treaty was never
ratified by the French government because of the arms agreement, although discrepancies
between the French and Arabic texts was the reason given 9.
The conclusion of the treaty did not end the ordeal for Gallieni and his group,
who continued to be detained at Nango until March 1881. During this period the
French engaged in a show of strength to maintain their prestige and avenge the
ambush at Dio. This action was carried out by a career artilleryman who had previously
served in Indochina, lieutenant colonel Gustave Borgnis-Desbordes, the superior
comwebmander of the Upper Senegal, and might have led to reprisals against the Frenchmen
at Nango, but Ahmadou wanted to avoid open conflict with France. Actually, Borgnis-Desbordes's
arrival at Kita to begin the construction of a fort and his destruction of the
village of Goubanko gave heart to the “captives,” and Gallieni's letters
to Ahmadou, after hearing this news, take on a much firmer tone. There was also
a note of desperation about Gallieni's action as he feared the angry sultan might
attack; but on March 10 the latter sent the signed treaty, along with horses and
supplies, and the Frenchmen were finally able to depart from Nango on March 21,
1881 10.
Ahmadou Shaykh, sultan de Ségou and Gallieni at Nango
Brière de L'Isle was unstinting in his praise, and Gallieni was promoted
to the rank of major and awarded the Cross of the Legion of Honor, but the mission
to Ségou could hardly be regarded as a success. However, it was followed
by an uneasy, ten-year truce; it opened up the route to the Niger; it arranged
treaties with the native chiefs; and it surveyed the route of the future railway
to the Niger.
The African climate and the rigors of the virtual captivity at Nango forced Gallieni
to take a long rest—two years in France and three years in Martinique. He
returned to France in June 1881 and the following summer, August 1882, the recently
promoted major was married to Marthe Savelli, a member of a Corsican family. As
a result of this marriage, Gallieni became master of a Provengal farmhouse near
Saint-Raphaël, La Gabelle, which was to be the Gallienis' home in France for
the rest of their lives. The assignment to Martinique, from April 1883 to May 1886,
offered an opportunity to write a book on his recent African experiences, Voyage
au Soudan français, and to complete his reports on the topography of the
Niger. Gallieni was always firm in the belief that he and others engaged in colonial
service should publish accounts of their actions as quickly as possible in order
to encourage French interest in the empire.
By the late 1880s French imperial interest seemed to be in a state of decline.
The Ferry ministry had been brought down over events in Tonkin, and the Boulanger
episode had renewed interest in Alsace-Lorraine. However, French advances continued
and the period from 1885 to 1889, especially in Africa, has been called “the
loaded pause.” 11. The Berlin conference of 1884 had set the ground rules
for the scramble for Africa, where the French were involved with all the old problems—tribal
conflicts, Moslem chiefs, difficulties with Great Britain, extension of the area
of French control, and completion of the railway. Between 1880 and 1886 Borgnis-Desbordes
and his successors had expanded the area of French control and had come into contact
with new and powerful Moslem leaders, The most important of these was Samory, who
caused trouble for the French for sixteen years, between 1882, when Borgnis-Desbordes
collided with him on the Niger, and his capture in 1898. The other major threat
came from the religious leader, or marabout, Mahmadu Lamine.
This was the situation in the Sudan when Gallieni returned to France in 1886 to
be promoted to lieutenant colonel; soon afterward he was summoned from Saint-Raphaël
to Paris by the undersecretary of state for the colonies, Jean de La Porte. Together
with Faidherbe, Brière de L'Isle, now deputy inspector general of the marine
infantry, and Borgnis-Desbordes, now the colonial department's Sudanese expert,
La Porte arranged for Gallieni to be named the new commandant of the French Sudan.
Borgnis-Desbordes even drafted the instructions, which called for a “firm,
prudent, and peaceful” policy, dealing first with the rebellion of Mahmadu
Lamine and then with the rehabilitation of the forts and the resumption of the
railway construction 12.
The lieutenant colonel who arrived at Dakar in October 1886 was much more mature
and experienced than the young captain of five years earlier, and during his term
as commandant he was able to initiate a policy of pacification that was the beginning
of his famous oil spot technique, used later in Tonkin and Madagascar. Gallieni's
twofold task was both diplomatic and military, negotiating where possible and using
force where necessary. The military task consisted of the consolidation and pacification
of those areas already taken, sometimes recklessly, by his predecessors. The more
fruitful diplomatic task consisted of the extension of French influence in the
neighboring states of the Upper Niger. In all this Gallieni's major concerns were
the growth of trade, which was possible only under peaceful conditions, and the
provision of effective protection for those who accepted French rule.
The first step was the preparation of an expedition against Mahmadu Lamine, who
had embarked upon an independent career as a religious leader against Ahmadou and
had taken up his position at Diana between the Senegal and Gambia rivers. Lamine
was a former disciple of Umar, the founder of the Tukulor empire, and an unsuccessful
claimant to his temporal rule. But before moving against this rebel leader, it
was necessary to assure the neutrality of Ahmadou and Samory by initiating negotiations,
which, even if unsuccessful, could give the French valuable time. Gallieni wrote
a friendly letter and sent gifts to Ahmadou, manifesting his desire to live in
peace. As for Samory, he sent an embassy under Captain Etienne Péroz to
renegotiate the treaty of March 1886, which had made concessions to the African
leader that the French no longer wanted to continue. Among other things, Gallieni
regarded French control of the entire left bank of the Niger as essential for the
development of commerce and for the diversion of the trade of the empire of Samory
to French and away from English territories 13.
The first attack against Mahmadu Lamine resulted in the destruction of his fortified
village of Diana in November-December 1886; but Lamine was able to escape and the
final reckoning with this African leader did not come until the following year
14. However, Gallieni immediately began arranging treaties with the local chieftains,
who accepted French protection and agreed to send their sons to French schools.
Faidherbe had founded the Ecole des otages at Saint-Louis, which produced the first
educated native administrators for Senegal, and Gallieni imitated Faidherbe's policy
in the Sudan since he regarded schools as one of the most important means of extending
French civilization and influence. These treaties also show Gallieni's primary
interest in economic considerations and the belief that he was in a race with the
English 15. His concern with trade did not imply ruthless exploitation of the natives.
He was a convinced imperialist—though a humanistic one—who regarded
Africa as potentially vital to the future of France. But he did not view Africans
with racial arrogance and he had a high opinion of many of those with whom he worked,
especially those who were loyal to the interests of France 16. Gallieni's later
policy of races, which took the interests of the natives into consideration, was,
as we have seen, one of his major achievements. Nevertheless, his first concern
was the interests of France, and native rulers and institutions that stood in the
way were to be eliminated.
While these events were taking place, Captain Péroz was successful in his
mission to Samory, who, with some reluctance, accepted the new French demands.
These included abandonment by Samory of the left bank of the Niger, acceptance
of a French protectorate, and agreement to the construction of a French fort at
Siguiri, at the junction of the Niger and Tinkisso rivers. This agreement of March-April
1887 had the effect of extending French control of the Upper Niger as far as Liberia
and Sierra Leone 17. Shortly after this event one more adversary was disposed of
permanently—with the capture of Soybu, the son of Mahmadu Lamine, who had
directed the siege of Bakel the previous year. Soybu had put up a stubborn fight
when taken and Gallieni indicated he would have liked to grant him a pardon, but
any act of clemency would have been regarded as a sign of weakness. A court-martial
returned a verdict of guilty and Gallieni ordered him shot (Soybu is reported to
have given thanks for being allowed to die like a soldier).
A new agreement was also reached with Ahmadou, the sultan of Ségou, in May
1887. Like Samory, Ahmadou needed French arms against his African adversaries,
and he offered even less objection to the French demands. By the treaty of Gouri
the states of the sultan were placed under French protection and opened to French
traders, who were also authorized to navigate the Niger and its tributaries. As
with the treaty with Samory, this agreement was only temporary so far as Gallieni
was concerned. He had no reason to trust the Tukulors and he regarded such agreements
as a means of forestalling the spread of British influence but in no way limiting
his own freedom of action.
In addition to military campaigns and diplomatic negotiations, Gallieni also directed
his attention toward the rebuilding and improvement of the areas under his control.
Expeditions were sent into previously unknown territory, new routes were surveyed
and roads built, and railway construction was resumed. The Upper
Niger was also divided into six cercles for better protection and administration.
Along with the establishment of écoles des otages (“schools for hostages”)
Gallieni also established villages de liberté (“freedom villages”)
to provide refuges for displaced natives, mostly former slaves, who were either
unable or unwilling to return to their old tribal organizations. Whether these
villages were simply friendly bases for the French, a means of fighting the slave
trade, a part of the oil spot technique, which—like the cercles—was
a method of providing centers from which French influence could spread, or simply
an attempt to assure a ready supply of laborers for public works is a subject of
controversy 18. With these considerable accomplishments behind him and with the
approach of the rainy season, Gallieni was able to take a leave of absence in France
between June and November 1887.
Upon his return to West Africa he resumed the unfinished business of Mahmadu Lamine,
launching a second campaign against this religious leader, who had regained much
of his strength and was attacking areas nominally under French protection. Although
Lamine had made offers of submission, Gallieni regarded these as ruses and was
determined to deal with him once and for all. With his usual care and skill, Gallieni
prepared for Lamine's destruction, something he believed was necessary not only
to bring peace to the region but also to remove any possible native threat to the
route to the Niger and the construction of the fort at Siguiri. The second campaign
against Mahmadu Lamine, under the leadership of Captain Fortin, assisted by African
allies, resulted in the capture of Lamine's stronghold at Tubakuta. Although Lamine
escaped, he was wounded and captured by an African rival and died while being taken
to the French. The death of the marabout produced the desired effect and the chiefs
signed treaties accepting French suzerainty in December 1887 19.
While the final expedition against Lamine was taking place, Gallieni was busy organizing
the move to Siguiri and the construction of a fort, an undertaking that also involved
the construction of roads, bridges, and telegraph lines. Since Samory had forced
the people to evacuate when he withdrew from the left bank of the Niger, Gallieni
had to make every effort to convince them that the French had come to stay. Although
not immediately successful in getting the people to return, he was encouraged by
the appearance of Moslem traders and expressed the hope that Siguiri would replace
the English posts in Sierra Leone.
Still an ardent expansionist, Gallieni wanted to increase the area of French influence
and trade even further and he sent out several missions, especially into Fouta
Djallon, which later became part of French Guinea. Gallieni sought to secure the
western region against possible British expansion, as well as to extend French
authority and commerce northeastward to the middle Niger, to Timbuktu, and to the
areas within the great loop of the river. Once again, the presumed threat of British—or
even German—interest in the region served as a spur to the French. At the
time, Gallieni regarded the area bounded by Saint-Louis, Timbuktu, Siguiri, and
Benty as a valuable commercial domain, and by launching a seeond gunboat on the
river he made France mistress of the Upper Niger 20.
It was on this tour of duty in the Sudan that Gallieni came into his own as a colonial
leader, having formulated his own ideas concerning the methods the French should
use in order to expand, pacify, and develop their colonial empire. During his first
assignment in West Africa he had been under the intellectual influence of Governor
Brière de L'Isle, but in the Sudan he became a leader and a man of initiative.
He also developed some definite ideas concerning the role of France in West Africa,
which were, unfortunately, not followed by his successor as commandant of the Sudan,
Major Louis Archinard 21.
The last chapter of Gallieni's book on his experience in the Sudan, Deux Campagnes
au Soudan français, 1886-1888, gives a careful evaluation of the French
position and the potential for the future. It is also an attack on the policies
of Archinard. Gallieni noted that the question of the French Sudan was closely
related to the overall African situation, especially in connection with the various
agreements with Germany, Portugal, and Great Britain. As a result of the agreements,
missions of exploration, and treaties with native rulers, the limits of French
control had been expanded in all directions, and objectives needed to be reconsidered
in this new light. He admitted his error in attempting to expand northward toward
Timbuktu. The French had been mistaken about the value of the upper Senegal and
Niger and he now considered the regions of Fouta Djallon and Rivières-du-Sud,
or French Guinea, as the most important for future development. These areas had
large populations, resources, and access to the sea. He had also changed his attitude
toward Ahmadou and the Tukulors, and he now believed that the veneer of civilization
given by Islam made them the best customers for French goods. He opposed any further
military action against the Tukulors or even against Samory since this would serve
only to decrease the population of an already underpopulated area. Although Gallieni
recognized that administration by the military was necessary until the economy
had developed sufficiently, he recommended that Europeans be replaced wherever
possible by Africans trained in French schools and also that the military forces
should be reduced—or at least the number of European soldiers.
Perhaps Gallieni's most striking change was in his opinion of the railway, which
he now considered of little value. Even if extended to the Niger, it would not
link up with either a great navigable river such as the Mississippi or the Amazon
or an important commercial route such as the Loire or the Rhine; perhaps worst
of all, the Niger flowed into British[-controlled] territory. The area had little
commerce—even Timbuktu was only a market for salt and slaves—and France
should avoid the acquisition of large areas simply for “map coloring” and
should confine itself to coasts and navigable rivers. French efforts and money
should be used for the building of roads and schools since this was the best means
of assisting the local people to develop commercially. Gallieni's recommendation
that old, expensive, useless forts be abandoned and that new ones of native materials
be located to create centers of influence was a forerunner of his oil spot technique,
and his proposal that further penetration be carried out in part by indigenous
peoples was a beginning of his policy of races 22.
Many of the same ideas were expressed in the report of a departmental commission
(1889-1890) on future French policy in the Sudan. This commission, on which Gallieni
represented the military, was established by the undersecretary of state for the
colonies, Eugène Etienne, who was convinced of the need for a reexamination
of objectives. It was Gallieni who had encouraged Etienne to convene this body,
and its report of January 1890 reflected the views of the commandant. It called
for an end to military conquest, major cuts in European troop's and their replacement
by Africans, and evacuation or reduction of forts and posts and it opposed extension
of the railway. Gallieni also submitted a special report calling for the occupation
of Fouta-Djallon. Unfortunately, only a few minor recommendations were carried
out. Any change of policy in the Sudan required the cooperation of the commandant,
and Major Archinard's views were diametrically opposed to those of his predecessor.
Archinard was determined to destroy—not to collaborate with—the Moslem
states, and the results were war against both Ahmadou and Samory, greatly increased
expenditures, and the destruction of any possiblity of economic development. He
was the protégé of Borgnis-Desbordes, who was now military advisor
to the colonial department, and they were the victors in this struggle. In spite
of efforts by Etienne to name Gallieni, it was Archinard who was reappointed to
the position of lieutenant governor of the French Sudan in 1892.
Gallieni returned to France in July 1888 after transferring his office to Archinard
and spent the next four years at home until he sailed for Tonkin in 1892. During
this period he not only completed a book on his second tour of duty in West Africa
and served on the colonial department commission in 1889-1890 but also continued
his military studies at the Ecole de guerre; Gallieni received the staffs special
congratulations and a commendation, along with his certification. This rare citation
came in spite of the attitude of the metropolitan army toward colonial officers
23. While at the Ecole de guerre Gallieni frequented the Latin Quarter and came
into contact with various literary and artistic groups. Among those he met were
Pierre Gheusi, later director of the Opéra comique and a member of Gallieni's
staff during his term as military governor of Paris (1914-1915), and Maurice Barrès,
the nationalist writer, who described Gallieni as “an Italian, a schemer” because
of his ability to confound his opponents 24.
In March 1891 Gallieni was promoted to the rank of colonel and given command of
the Sixth Marine Regiment at Brest, from which he was assigned as chief of staff
of the colonial army corps at Paris. By this time he was eager to return to overseas
duty, and reports from Indochina encouraged him to become a tonkinois as well as
a former soudanais 25. Perhaps his failure to be reappointed to the Sudan in place
of Archinard, or his opposition to the policies of the military in that region,
encouraged him to seek a new arena. At any rate, he sailed for Tonkin in September
1892.
Although the Ferry cabinet had fallen in 1885 over the attempt to control Tonkin,
the French had remained. The result was several years of expensive fighting against
the so-called Black Flags, or “pirates” —guerrillas under local
warlords whom the French regarded, rightly or wrongly, as agents of Chinese arms
and policy. Unquestionably, they were aided by elements in China and it was not
until the border was secured that their resistance to French occupation was controlled.
It was this protracted conflict that Gallieni lived with from 1892 until 1896.
One possible advantage to France of this long struggle was that it provided a laboratory
for the rising school of colonial administrators. It was in Tonkin that Gallieni
perfected his policy of races in pacifying and organizing the border provinces.
This period in his career was also a decisive factor in the elaboration of his
techniques of colonial warfare, which he later put to good use in Madagascar.
Gallieni was “aided by a staff of brilliant officers—if they outranked
him, he inspired them, if they were subordinates, he taught them.” 26 The
most famous of these subordinates as Major Hubert Lyautey who at the age of forty
had left the metropolitan army for service in the colonies. Lyautey found his career
in colonial administration serving under Gallieni, whom he admired both as a man
and as an administrator, and he told his mentor: “I regard myself as the
apostle of your ideas, the flag bearer of your method.” 27 The two men were
attracted to each other immediately and became lifelong friends and associates.
They both disliked bureaucratic red tape, and one of the first “lessons” Gallieni
gave to Lyautey on this subject was to take away the latest service manual and
similar works the latter had brought from France so that he would not even be tempted
to look at them, saying “it is on the spot, in handling men and things that
you learn your job.” 28 Gallieni noted that he was careful not to tell Hanoi
the full extent of his plans and to describe his “most daring and revolutionary
acts” as “mere rectifications of parishes”; yet he also said
that one should “violate all the stifling rules” and not be afraid
to speak out through books, newspapers, and in public even at the risk of loss
of promotion and career 29.
Gallieni was able to get so much from his subordinates because he chose the man
he felt capable of doing the job and then left him a free hand to carry out the
assigned task—at least this was the case with men such as Lyautey. He drove
his men, but he left the initiative to them and he was open to suggestions. Lyautey
noted with amazement that he once saw Gallieni send an order by telegram “at
the suggestion of a mere sergeant.” 30 When Gallieni named Lyautey as his
chief of staff during a major military operation against the “pirates” in
1895, he made it clear that he did not want to hear about problems, that his only
concern was results. He believed that Lyautey could perform the task, but if not
he would drop him “like a hot potato,” that where the service was concerned
he had no sentiment 31. It was also Gallieni's habit to avoid discussion of an
operation once it was under way and to divert himself with a book on philosophy
or an English novel. As he explained to Lyautey, the leaders understand the orders
and, if they do not, nothing more can be done. Above all, messengers should never
be sent as they would cause confusion and useless trouble and probably would not
arrive in time.
In 1891 Jean de Lanessan had been named governor-general of Indochina and he brought
with him a new policy of dealing with the Black Flags. This included division oaf
the area of Tonkin along the Chinese border into four military zones headed by
comwebmanders with full military and civil authority to destroy the rebels and to
pacify and organize the country. Gallieni was assigned to the relatively quiet
First Military Territory between Hanoi and the Chinese frontier, and here he put
his methods into operation. They included fortification of the frontier, sealing
off the Black Flags and preventing them from crossing back and forth from China,
and enlistment of the villagers by supplying them with rifles and ammunition, under
careful supervision, so that they could provide their own protection against the
guerrillas. This was a part of the larger system he developed, known as “progressive
occupation,” which put forth the idea that it was not enough to defeat the
enemy, that the military comwebmander must look forward to the organization of the
country in cooperation with the local population. Lyautey defined progressive occupation
by saying that “military occupation consists less in military operation than
in an organization on the march.” 32
Gallieni was able to give wider application to these ideas and methods when he
was named comwebmander of the Second Military Territory. The situation here was much
less settled than in the First Territory and initially more military action was
required. Although progressive occupation called for the avoidance of the use of
military columns whenever possible, Gallieni was willing to take such action where
necessary, as in the reduction of the guerrilla stronghold of Lung Lat. His policy
of providing arms for the villagers also paid off in this engagement, as it was
they who fatally wounded the guerrilla chief 33.
Progressive occupation required men capable of dealing with all types of problems,
civilian as well as military. Once the necessary military action had ended, in
fact, the duties of his soldiers became essentially civilian in nature, and Gallieni
wanted the collaboration of the men as well as the officers in this work 34. He
was proud to note that, as in the Sudan under him and in Algeria under Marshal
Bugeaud, the comwebmanders of sectors and posts had made themselves into engineers
and architects, and the legionnaires, colonial infantry, and native sharpshooters
had become bricklayers, carpenters, and blacksmiths—an example of the ability
and ingenuity of soldiers when given a job to do. Gallieni believed that it was
desirable to have soldiers perform useful tasks as supervisors of construction,
teachers, and skilled workers. Unlike many other military men, he did not believe
that such work, with its consequent abandonment of the drill field, was prejudicial
to military discipline. In fact, he believed that by providing the soldier with
interesting work his concern for the colony increased, even to the extent of settlement
in the country after the end of'his term of service. He regarded the soldier as
the precursor and collaborator of the colonist, not as a conqueror with no consideration
for the future. At times Gallieni felt moments of envy for his civilian colleagues
but then he concluded that he liked the excitement of the unexpected and the dangers
of his task—the challenge of being the first to bring European civilization
to other peoples. It was the lot of the military to prepare the way for a civilian
authority.
By the time his command was scheduled to end in the summer of 1895, Gallieni was
becoming more and more restive under the increasing demands to adhere to bureaucratic
regulations. At one time, when he saved provisions worth a million francs by taxing
gambling houses to get funds that were not forthcoming from the administrative
center at Hanoi, he was informed that it would have been better to have lost the
stores rather than to have saved them by “irregular methods.” Governor-general
Léon Rousseau, at least originally, was much less sympathetic to Gallieni's
methods than Lanessan had been and there was increasing control from Hanoi; but
Gallieni remained until the early part of 1896 in order to lead one more military
operation against a powerful guerrilla chief. By the time of his departure, however,
he was deeply concerned about the continuation of the system he had established
and which had met with such success 35.
He returned from Tonkin with his politique des races developed, the policy that
he was to apply most successfully in Madagascar. This program included three major
points:
Political action was, for Galliéni, primarily an ethnographic problem because it consisted of the recognition and the profitable employment of the local usable elements—the people, the workers—and the neutralization, if necessary the destruction, of the nonusable elements—the rebellious or unsubdued chiefs whose prestige must be destroyed and whose forces must be annihilated. As for the use of force, he noted that the purpose of all forward movement is the effective occupation of the conquered territory and that these actions must be joined as soon as possible to economic action. The purpose of the conquest is to restore peace; to assure the social needs of the populace by the establishment of markets, dispensaries, infirmaries, and schools; and to improve the economy by opening channels of communication and transport and by creating outlets for the products of the country.
When he returned to France in 1896, Gallieni had reason to expect a long leave
with his family at Saint-Raphaël after three and a half years in Indochina.
However, in April the new colonial minister, André Lebon, summoned him to
compliment him on his work in Tonkin and to discuss the current situation in Madagascar.
Lebon knew of Gallieni's success in West Africa and Indochina. Lebon also had news
of Gallieni from his friends and advisors in various imperialist and colonial organizations,
such as the Union coloniale and the Comité de l'Afrique frangaise, and from
those who had received glowing letters in his praise from Major Lyautey 37. A few
days later Lebon offered Gallieni the command of the Madagascar corps of occupation
with full civil and military authority. It was an offer that Gallieni felt he could
not refuse although he was aware of the difficulties. Not only was the situation
in Madagascar disturbing, but the political situation in France was anything but
stable. During the time Gallieni had been in Indochina (1892-1896) there had been
ten governments, and the colonial office, which had been separated from the navy
only in 1894, had Lebon as its fifth minister. This was disturbing to a man who
believed that no work was possible without continuity of action and unity of views.
This was also the period of the Panama scandal, the assassination of President
Carnot by an anarchist, and the beginning of the Dreyfus affair.
France had a long interest in Madagascar dating back to the days of Richelieu and
Louis XIV. Though the French never relinquished their claims, they were of no practical
importance until they were willing to support them by force, and there was little
reason to do so until France knew something of the prize. This was not revealed
until the explorations of Alfred Grandidier between 1865 and 1870. During the course
of the nineteenth century the situation was complicated by the appearance of English
and other missionaries, especially those of the London Missionary Society. It was
not until the 1880s, however, that the Franco-Malagasy conflict became serious,
leading to a war (1883-1885) that resulted in the establishment of a French protectorate
in 1895. The treaty saved the faces of both sides since the French recognized the
Merina kingdom of Madagascar, which controlled, directly or indirectly, about two-thirds
of the island.
However, the fall of the Ferry government implied a ban on further colonial ventures
and the Malagasy construed the treaty as a victory. The Merina were not content
to leave well enough alone and the next decade was one of alone and the next decade was one of conflict involving the French, English, and
Malagasy. In 1894 the French sent Charles Le Myre de Vilers to establish a real
protectorate, but after his forced withdrawal from the capital the next steps were
an ultimatum and war. In 1895 General Jacques Duchesne led an expeditionary force
that finally succeeded in taking Tananarive after seven months. But the chief enemies
of the French were the terrain, problems of supply, and disease.
Although Queen Ranavalona III was forced to accept a treaty giving France possession
of the island in January 1896, this did not meet the problem because it continued
the fiction that the Merina kingdom and Madagascar were synonymous. The result
was that almost immediately after the conquest practically the whole island was
in a state of anarchy, with rebels rising up against the Merina or the French or
both. Conditions were made worse by the conflict between General Emile Voyron,
the successor to Duchesne, and the new resident general, Hippolyte Laroche. The
latter was a cultivated, Protestant freethinker whose only colonial service had
been a short term in Algeria, whereas Voyron was an old colonial soldier, undiplomatic,
intensely Catholic, and unsympathetic to the Third Republic. All these factors
plus the change of ministries in 1895-1896 contributed to the initial failure in
Madagascar.
The situation was further complicated by the argument over the method to be used
in handling the latest French acquisition. After 1890 the anticolonial spirit in
France had begun to lessen but there was division among the colonialists. There
were those who still held to the old policy of annexation and assimilation even
though assimilation had failed in Indochina. At the other extreme were those who
favored the newer idea of the protectorate as exemplified in Tunisia, and there
was a third school that held that annexation did not necessarily imply assimilation.
Out of this third school developed the new policy of “association,” which
was to be best exemplified by Gallieni in Madagascar. As a result of this conflict,
Madagascar became a kind of “touchstone of colonial policy.” 38 At
the moment, the French ministry and Parliament were generally opposed to assimilation,
and in view of the recent success in Tonkin it was only natural that association
be applied in Madagascar. Diplomatic disputes, as well as internal difficulties
on the island, served to encourage the French government to declare Madagascar
a colony rather than a protectorate in August 1896 39. Having adopted this new
policy, the next step was to find an experienced man who was both an able soldier
and a skilled administrator. The choice for Lebon was obviously limited, but the
selection of Gallieni proved to be most fortunate for both France and Madagascar.
Although he was familiar with military events that had been taking place on the
island, Gallieni admitted that he had little knowledge of other aspects and he
sought advice from Alfred Grandidier, the great explorer and authority on Madagascar.
Characteristically, while seeking advice from experts, Gallieni had no interest
in cluttering up his mind with official reports and refused the enormous dossiers
offered by the minister, saying he preferred to await his arrival at the scene
before judging the situation and deciding upon the measures to be taken 40.
In July 1896 Gallieni was named comwebmander of the French troops in Madagascar and
the following month he was advanced to rank of brigadier greneral and departed
for his new assignment, arriving in Tananarive on September 16. Although his first
instructions were limited to military powers Gallieni insisted that all powers—military,
political, and administrative—must be combined to be effective. After the
usual bureaucratic delays, this concentration of powers was effected and Gallieni
was now free to take the action he deemed necessary 41. At the time he arrived,
all of Imerina was in revolt except the area around Tananarive, communication to
the coast was precarious, villages were depopulated, and commerce was paralyzed
42. The situation called for immediate military action and the application of the
oil spot technique by the establishment of military cercles. The policy of races
had to wait until some semblance of order had been achieved. Imerina was divided
into four cercles, with all military and civil authority concentrated in the comwebmander
of the cercle, who was responsible only to Gallieni.
Popular resistance against French occupation had broken out at the end of the rainy
season in March 1896 and spread throughout the island. Not only were the Merina
in revolt, but resistance movements developed among the tribes wholly or partially
independent of the Merina monarchy. Since Gallieni believed that opposition to
the French conquest was mainly Merina resistance led by members of the old ruling
class with the royal court and the queen as the rallying point, he began a policy
of appeal to the various tribes, especially those that had been vassals of the
Merina. But first he moved against the obstacle of the Merina monarchy. He insisted
that Queen Ranavalona III, as a French subject, call upon him when he took over
the powers of resident general, and he “twisted the knife” by asking
his pro-Malagasy predecessor, Laroche, to convey the message. He replaced the Merina
flag with the French tricolor and informed the queen that she was now merely “Queen
of Imerina” rather than “Queen of Madagascar.” 43
When the resistance continued, Gallieni moved against the royal officials. The
prime minister was forced to resign, and the minister of the interior and an uncle
of the queen were condemned and shot, an action that Gallieni later regretted.
Events surrounding the national-religious ceremony of the Festival of the Bath,
November 20, 1896, convinced Gallieni that the queen must go, but he was not yet
ready to move. By February 1897 he was ready, and the queen was suddenly informed
that she would depart for Réunion within six hours. Gallieni's interpretation
of the action was that he had “invited the queen to resign her functions
and at her request [had] authorized her departure to the island of Réunion.” This
fait accompli raised a storm of protest in Parliament, but Gallieni received the
support of the cabinet even though Lebon had advised against hasty action 44. Gallieni
explained his high-handedness by saying that difficulties of communication did
not permit instructions on every decision and that all his acts were guided by
three principles essential for the establishment of French control—destruction
of the prestige and authority of the Merina, replacement of English influence by
French, and development of commerce. The final and most telling argument was that
the exile of the queen had been successful.
Destruction of the monarchy had removed the only national symbol from the revolt
and had also answered the question of Merina hegemony, but the state of anarchy
was still serious. The insurrection might have been suppressed by a massive military
action, but Gallieni's instructions from Lebon had specifically enjoined against
this, especially the use of French troops. At any rate, this was not his method
of operation and he intended to use the oil spot with its economy of men and money.
The central plateau, including Imerina and Betsileo, was the most important part
of the island, along with the route from Tananarive to the port of Tamatave. With
order restored in this central area, pacification would then spread out from this
oil spot, which included efforts to gain support of the non-Merina peoples.
In addition to the centralization of all authority in his own hands and the organization
of military cercles a general staff of seven bureaus was set up by Gallieni to
control all activities—civil and military—on the island. As pacification
progressed, new military cercles were added and old cercles were grouped together
into military territories. The native peoples were handled under the policy of
races by which the Merina hegemony was suppressed and the former subject peoples
were convened to choose their own leaders. When important rebel leaders surrendered,
Gallieni made a great show of clemency in order to persuade them to use their influence
with those still in rebellion and even restored some to their former positions.
This tactic, along with a few executions and deportations, achieved the desired
results 45. Madagascar was fortunate in having Gallieni, whose actions compare
most favorably with the methods used by the French following the Malagasy rebellion
of 1947, which resulted in repression, mass arrests, and a large number of victims.
By the spring of 1897 the center of the island was sufficiently pacified to allow
the grouping of the cercles into larger territories with greatly reduced forces.
Gallieni also made use of the method he had tried successfully in Tonkin—the
arming of loyal partisans so that they could defend their villages against attacks
of the insurgents. With the accomplishment of this first state of pacification,
he made a triumphal tour of inspection around the island in May and June, much
in the style of the Merina rulers, to meet with Merina vassals. Part of the purpose
of the tour was to determine the military situation for the second stage of pacification
in the coastal regions during the summer and fall of 1897. One of these actions
was to be under the command of Lyautey, who had come to Madagascar to serve under
his old comwebmander again.
In spite of his success, Gallieni encountered considerable opposition from Parliament
that was more concerned with “jokers and charlatans” such
as Boulanger than with colonial affairs and from the civil and military authorities
in a “France more mandarinized than China.” 46 The second stage of
operations was sufficiently successful, however, to enable him to make a second
tour of inspection from June to October 1898. Whereas the first tour was primarily
military, the second tour was largely political in character.
Before his departure from Tananarive, Gallieni issued his “Instructions of
May 22, 1898,” the most complete statement of his doctrines of pacification
and administration. In it he emphasized his policy of races, or association, or
indirect rule. The objective of this policy was to separate the peoples into their
own racial groups without forcing them into a uniform method of organization and
administration and always taking into account the manners and customs of the different
peoples of the island. In his speeches to the various local groups, Gallieni emphasized
that they should learn the French language in order to become “devoted associates” of
the French colonists, who came to bring them “wealth and civilization,” but
that they were free to preserve their customs, religion, and traditional dances.
Before the close of 1899 the entire island seemed to be pacified and, although
there was a revolt in the south in 1904, the fact that Madagascar was singularly
free from internal violence until the revolt of 1947 was largely the result of
the foundations laid by Gallieni 47.
Allied with the problem of the monarchy, but not so easily solved by a coup, was
the question of religion. There had been a continuing struggle among English, French,
American, and Norwegian Protestants and French Catholics, the major contestants
being the London Missionary Society and the French Jesuits. The religious conflict
was complicated by the fact that education was in the hands of the missionaries,
with more than two-thirds of the schools under foreign Protestants, mainly the
London Missionary Society. Since Gallieni considered education of the utmost importance
in the establishment of French control, it was necessary for him to take action,
although he noted “it was not easy to maneuver between Luther and Loyola.” 48
Instructions from Lebon had called for religious neutrality and, so far as religion
itself was concerned, Gallieni was in complete agreement. French Protestants and
French Catholics could argue over the Malagasy as much as they wished since this
did not involve the question of French domination, but Gallieni was not so neutral
where foreign missions were concerned. His program in Madagascar has been compared
with that of Richelieu “to humble the House of Austria, the nobles, and the
Protestants.” For Gallieni the House of Austria was Great Britain, the nobles
were the Merina officials and the queen, and the Protestants were, above all, the
missionaries of the London Missionary Society. Like Richelieu, Gallieni felt the
latter comprised a “state within a state.” 49
Although some of Gallieni's actions unfavorably affected the Protestant mission
schools, such as the decrees that French be the basis of instruction and that no
Malagasy who did not speak and write French be employed by the government, he had
no desire to destroy such schools and even encouraged French Protestants and Catholic
orders other than the Jesuits to establish new missions. He did take over some
of the mission schools and hospitals after adequate compensation was given, but
he never touched the churches and ordered the return of some that had been confiscated.
Perhaps the most important result of this religious-educational conflict was that
Gallieni felt it necessary to establish an official lay system of education, which
was the foundation of the program lasting until independence in 1960 and beyond
50. The emphasis was upon practical education in contrast to the traditional literary
emphasis in other French colonies. His aim was to train farmers and artisans not
savants or a dangerous intellectual proletariat. All three levels of the official
schools were directed toward this end. The first (rural) level emphasized handicrafts
and agriculture, the second level provided more advanced training for industrial
and agricultural apprentices, and the third level continued this process. At this
last level the three most important schools were the Ecole de médecine to
train medical assistants, the Ecole professionelle to train craftsmen and teachers
of crafts, and the Ecole normale Le Myre de Vilers to train interpreters and government
administrators. Almost all of Madagascar's present leaders are products of these
institutions established by Gallieni. His interest in education and cultural life
extended beyond the schools and, in line with his policy of association, he encouraged
the scholarly activities of the Comité de Madagascar, founded the Académie
malgache in 1902, and required his subordinates to learn the Malagasy language.
By the spring of 1899, it was possible for Gallieni to return to France for an
extended leave (April 1899-August 1900). The combination of force and diplomacy
had secured most of the island except for some areas of the west and south. One
reason for the return was to secure finances for his expensive public works—the
railway from Tananarive to the east coast, roads, telegraph lines, and the naval
base at Diégo-Suarez, the construction of which was carried out under Colonel
Joseph Joffre of the corps of engineers.
This period during the Dreyfus affair, between the Fashoda crisis and the outbreak
of the Boer war, was not opportune for Gallieni's plans and caused his stay in
France to be much longer than he originally intended. It also posed the danger
that he and his subordinates might be drawn into the struggle; and Gallieni gave
strict orders to his assistants, including Colonel Lyautey, to concern themselves
exclusively with Madagascar. Although he claimed that Dreyfus and Zola “left
him cold,” there were apparently some rightist leaders and groups who viewed
Gallieni as a “man on horseback” and the minister of war, General de
Galliffet, is reported to have jested that if he were Gallieni, he would be sleeping
at the Elysée within a week 51. However, the delay gave Gallieni and his
assistants an opportunity to gain support from various colonial groups, especially
the Comité de l'Afrique française. This group included diverse personalities
from politics, finance, and industry, such as Joseph Chailley-Bert, secretary-general
of the Union coloniale française and founder of the Institut colonial international,
and Eugène Etienne, deputy from Oran, former colonial minister, and leader
of the colonial group in the Chamber. While avoiding the invitations of the rightist
groups, Gallieni spoke to the Union coloniale frangaise, the Comité de Madagascar,
the Société de géographie, the chambers of commerce at Marseilles,
Lyon, and Rouen, and to educational institutions. He was pleased that his speech
at the Sorbonne was so well received that he had to escape from students shouting “Vive
Gallieni !” 52 Only after months of work, hopes, disappointments, and anger
was he able to get the loan of 60 million francs for the railway and other public
works. Once this was achieved, the growing involvement of the ministry in the separation
of church and state caused Gallieni to conclude that there was no longer any reason
to remain in France.
The return to Madagascar for his second tour of duty (1900-1905) involved celebrations
that verged on the regal—an inspection of the naval base at Diégo-Suarez,
a review of the troops, and a tour of the northern part of the island before making
a triumphal entry into Tananarive with the first automobiles on Madagascar. Gallieni
was always interested in the latest technical and mechanical developments and often
used them to impress the local peoples. Rebel chiefs who had been exiled to Réunion
were allowed to return, and the ashes of Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony, husband
of queens Ranavalona II and Ranavalona III, were brought back from Algeria. Although
pleased by the reception, Gallieni ordered that it be the last such celebration.
In an order to the comwebmanders of territories, cercles, and provinces, he noted
that official festivities were formerly necessary as traditional manifestations
of submission to authority but that the Malagasy had now freely rallied to the
French cause and such celebrations were not in accord with principles of liberalism
and democracy.
The second period was largely devoted to the organization and development of the
colony, in contrast to the first, which was concerned mainly with pacification—although
Gallieni's program always combined pacification and organization. However, the
southern third of the island was still not under French control except for scattered
centers, and this task was assigned to Colonel Lyautey as supreme comwebmander of
the south. With his most trusted lieutenant in charge, Gallieni felt free to devote
himself to primarily non-military matters. Although the pacification of the south
was completed by 1902, Lyautey warned of the possibility of future troubles, and
in 1904 rebellion broke out 53. The uprising was not especially serious and was
suppressed more by the use of tact than by force, but it aroused considerable criticism
of Gallieni and his methods. He was charged with levying taxes solely for income
without consideration of the needs of the people, and local French officials were
accused of gross maladministration. Among the critics was Victor Augagneur, Gallieni's
successor as governor-general 54. Undoubtedly, there were many reasons for the
revolt, such as unwise actions by local officials and settlers that aroused native
resentment. Gallieni warned against blunders and abuses that have “most regrettable
consequences” and he made much of finding the right man for the job, but
he was not always able to do so. Although he probably moved around supervising
his men more than almost any other colonial official, he could not detect and prevent
all abuses. He always professed to be unmoved by the attacks of his critics; yet
he was keenly aware of criticism and defended his actions in letters to friends
55.
With respect to economic development, one of the major problems in Madagascar—as
in the other colonies where Gallieni had served—was that of labor supply.
The precipitate abolition of slavery in 1896 complicated the problem of providing
the labor needed for the immense task of construction of public works as well as
for the development of agricultural and industrial enterprises that would compensate
France for the costly military operations of conquest. Gallieni attempted to find
a solution in various ways, but his efforts and those of succeeding administrators
were generally unsuccessful in supplying labor in sufficient quantity for European
enterprise.
In 1896 the Merina corvée system of forced labor was reintroduced for the
construction of public works. A head tax was ordered that forced the natives to
work in order to obtain money to pay it. Attempts to recruit workers from Asia
and Africa were, on the whole, unsuccessful. Although the system of forced labor
was abolished by Gallieni in 1900, it was revived by Augagneur, his successor,
and lasted until 1946. In spite of the problems with labor, Madagascar experienced
an economic boom during most of Gallieni's term, aided by the public works projects.
But there was also the introduction of new crops, and between 1896 and 1905 imports
rose from 13.9 million to 31.2 million francs, and exports increased from 3.6 million
to 22.5 million francs. Gallieni was pleased to claim that French commerce had
grown from nine percent to ninety-two percent of the total trade of Madagascar
56.
The long-range plans to increase the labor supply, aside from the educational system
with its emphasis upon the training of semiskilled and skilled workers, included
such efforts as the encouragement of legal marriages and large families by exempting
fathers from forced labor and military service, the fostering of public health,
special taxes for single persons, and the institution of the F6te des enfants,
an idea that Gallieni got from Indochina. All of these efforts were particularly
directed toward the Merina, as Gallieni now considered them to be the only group
capable of producing a skilled work force 57. Public health services were vital
not only for the future population but also for the existing population. Continuing
the work of the missionaries, a school of medicine was inaugurated at Tananarive
and a territorial health system was organized. Gallieni believed that the establishment
of charitable and benevolent institutions by the state was both a humanitarian
obligation and an economic necessity and that no other expenditures could more
effectively serve the spread of French influence and colonization.
Gallieni began with high hopes that Madagascar would become a French equivalent
of Canada, Australia, or New Zealand as a place for settlers, and he urged his
officers to do everything possible to assist the colonists who would develop the
colony with their skills and capital. He fostered the publication of a guide for
immigrants and sought the support of French colonial organizations. One of the
colonization schemes called for the encouragement of soldiers to settle on the
land after the expiration of their terms of enlistment, but this also proved to
be a disappointment. Gallieni eventually came to the same conclusion as Joseph
Chailley-Bert that Madagascar was not a colony for European settlement; but inspite
of the difficulties he believed it would not be the last of the French
possessions to justify the hopes of the mother country 58.
At the time of the resignation of Premier Waldeck-Rousseau in 1902, Gallieni put
himself at the disposal of the colonial office to decide whether he should be replaced
by a civil governor. Personal reasons may have partly dictated this action. He
was then the youngest divisional general in the army, having been raised to that
rank in 1899, and he was well aware of the attitude of the metropolitan army toward
colonial officers. Gallieni had gone as far as he could possibly go in the colonial
service and perhaps it was well to look toward the continuation of his military
career in France. Should he return, he was assured of the command of an army corps.
However, his desire to oversee the completion of the first stage of the Tamatave-Tananarive
railway, and possibly the political situation in France under the anticlerical,
antimilitary Combes ministry, encouraged him to remain until 1905. In October 1904
Gallieni presided over the inauguration of the first section of the railway, and
he was now eager to return home, feeling that it was necessary only to continue
improving upon what had already been accomplished in Madagascar. He expressed the
hope that his work and the efforts of his collaborators would bring to France “not
only material profits but also the honor of having brought to a new people the
benefits of its civilizing influence.” 59 Although he sailed for France in
May 1905, he continued in his official position until November, when he was replaced
by Victor Augagneur, deputy of the Rhone. Gallieni was then awarded the Grand Cross
of the Legion of Honor in recognition of his services to France and appointed inspector
general of the colonial army.
Madagascar was Gallieni's last real colonial assignment, the remaining years of
his life being spent with military duties in France. His impact upon the island
was greater than that of any other individual, “and there is almost no aspect
of the island's development on which [he] did not leave his mark,” 60. He
was the man who “really made Madagascar” and his policy of races caused
the colony to be “an interesting study, not only in French colonization,
but in the wider history of comparative colonial methods.” 61 If anything,
his policy may have been too successful. Although it produced generally desirable
results, it was “too personal, too rich in experiences and personal reflections” to
be followed by other governors who were less aware of the traditions of the country.
An indication of the lasting quality of Gallieni's governorship is that most of
the structures laid down by him lasted until political independence in 1960, and
many of them were continued by the government of the Malagasy republic.
Following his return to France, Gallieni completed the editing of his official
report Madagascar de 1896 a 1905, to which he later added another work covering
the same material for the general public, Neuf Ans à Madagascar. He spent
the remainder of 1905 at his home, La Gabelle, near Saint-Raphaël, surrounded
by souvenirs of his colonial career, and in 1906 he returned to duty as comwebmander
of the Twelfth Corps at Clermont-Ferrand and then of the Fourteenth Corps, with
the additional duty of military governor of Lyon. Aware of the fact that his colonial
service had left him out of touch with the “higher study of war” and
large-scale operations, he asked that a recent Ecole de guerre graduate be assigned
to him. The results of his studies and thoughts on military subjects are to be
found in a massive, three-volume manuscript 62. He was such an apt pupil of operations
that in the maneuvers of 1912, as comwebmander of the “Blues,” he crushed
the opposition “Reds,” capturing the comwebmander and his entire staff.
In time of war, it would have been a stunning victory 63.
In August 1908 Gallieni was appointed to the supreme war council, a position he
held until his retirement in April 1914. It was in this capacity that he played
a major role in the great crisis in the French command in 1911. Adolphe Messimy,
minister of war in the cabinet of Joseph Caillaux, was an advocate of the offensive à outrance
and immediately upon taking office began searching for a successor to the cautious,
defensive General Victor Michel as vice-president of the supreme war council. Michel's
defensive proposals, envisaging a German attack through Belgium that should be
met with an army increased by reserves, were completely contrary to the offensive
ideas later embodied in Plan XVII and were rejected by the council. Although Gallieni
accepted Michel's ideas on the German attack and on artillery, he had little faith
in vast numbers of reservists because of his belief in the value of training and
he did not consider the vice-president the “right man in the right place.” 64
The usual story concerning the appointment of General Joseph Joffre as comwebmander
of the French army is the one given by Messimy, who claimed he offered the position
to Gallieni, the candidate of Premier Caillaux and an undoubted republican; but
Gallieni refused because he had participated in the removal of Michel, was too
old, and was a colonial. When asked for suggestions, Gallieni is said to have recommended
General Paul Pau or Joffre; but Pau was a reactionary who dewebmanded the right to
name generals, whereas Joffre was a reputed republican and former Freemason. The
latter was also attractive to Messimy as an advocate of the offensive 65. However,
in view of Gallieni's presumed reasons for refusal, his suggestions appear odd.
Pau was a year older and thus had even less time before reitrement; Joffre was
a colonial with far less experience in military campaigns or administration and
had never comwebmanded an army 66. The appointment of Joffre was regarded as a victory
for Colonel de Grandmaison, the “Young Turks,” and the doctrine of
the offensive, and Liddell Hart described Gallieni's recommendation of his former
subordinate as “the one disservice he rendered to France and the worst to
himself.” 67
By 1913 Gallieni saw war coming to an unprepared France, and by 1914 he was even
more concerned. He urged the strengthening of defenses and troops in the north
and replacement of the red trousers of French troops, but he was attacked as a
general with the Grand Cross and the Military Medal, with nothing more to wish
for, reaching the age of retirement, who now wanted to abandon Plan XVII and even
change the uniforms 68. Retirement was something Gallieni viewed with mixed emotions.
He was under a government he considered heedless of dangers, yet he was displeased
with the rapidity with which he was placed on reserve on his sixty-fifth birthday.
After some delay, he was retained as president of the council for the defense of
the colonies, but the first signs of the illness that was to cause his death and
the illness of his wife called for rest at La Gabelle. It was a very short retirement
as Marthe Savelli-Gallieni died from a cerebral hemorrhage on July 17, the day
he received news of his recall to duty by the minister of war.
Upon his arrival in Paris on August 2, Gallieni was informed by Joffre and Messimy
that he had been named as assistant and eventual successor to the comwebmander in
chief. But Joffre had no desire to have at headquarters his potential replacement,
senior officer, and former comwebmander or even to keep him informed of operations
69. As a result, Gallieni was left at the war ministry as a “fifth wheel,” daily
growing more alarmed at the failures of Plan XVII and the battle of the frontiers.
These failures forced Premier René Viviani to reshuffle his cabinet and
to replace Messimy with Alexandre Millerand on August 26. Messimy's last act as
minister of war was to dismiss General Michel again, this time as military governor
of Paris, in favor of General Gallieni. The latter immediately set to work on the
neglected defenses of the city. Unlike Joffre, he believed it essential to hold
Paris, and when the government departed leaving him with all civil and military
powers, his famous proclamation of September 3 made it clear that he intended to
defend the city to the end 70.
Fortunately, Gallieni did not limit himself to the defense of Paris and “by
keeping his eyes on the wider horizon … by exceeding his duty, he perceived
and seized the chance to save not merely Paris but France.” 71 When he became
aware of the shift of von Kluck's First Army, he urged an attack on the German
flank, but he was faced with the formidable task of getting Joffre and the British
under Sir John French to act. His insistence on an attack north of the Marne and
his actions on September 4 in getting Joffre's agreement caused him to remark that
the battle of the Marne was won by coups de telephone. Seeing his moment slipping
away, he called Joffre, insisted on speaking to him personally, and finally got
the comwebmander in chief's approval of a strike north of the Marne on September 6.
Since Joffre had taken control of the Army of Paris, Gallieni's major role once
the battle began was to supply troops and equipment, especially to the Sixth Army,
under General Michel Maunoury. The most famous of these actions was his use of
hundreds of taxis to speed troops to the front—one more example of Gallieni's
willingness to employ modern technology and a forerunner of the motorized armies
of the future.
Perhaps no battle has caused more controversy or given rise to more legends than
that of the Marne. The controversy over the roles played by Joffre and Gallieni
was mainly carried on by the partisans of each, but the comwebmander in chief certainly
helped to bring it on by his immediate efforts to belittle his rival. The basic
argument of the supporters of Joffre is that he gave the final order and bore the
ultimate responsibility, but “General Gallieni had sought to suggest the
opportune moment” and had been “the inspirer of the hour.” 72
Gallieni believed that he could have had a decisive instead of a limited victory
had he been given the troops he requested, and he resented the fact that he was
the only major participant not awarded the Croix de guerre. Nevertheless, he believed
that history would justify his position 73.
The year following the battle of the Marne was a difficult one for Gallieni. Although
he remained as military governor, he was once more something of a “fifth
wheel,” especially after the return of the government to Paris. There were
repeated promises of an active command, but they were always opposed by Joffre,
who even wanted to have General Ferdinand Foch designated his successor. Gallieni
eventually came to the conclusion that the comwebmander in chief was a “clever
peasant.” 74 During this period Gallieni grew more concerned and critical
of the military failures and stalemate in the West. By late 1914 or early 1915
he, along with Briand and Franchet d'Esperey in France and Lloyd George, Kitchener,
and Churchill in England, was proposing a second front in the Balkans. Joffre,
of course, was opposed, claiming he needed every man and would soon achieve victory
in the West and that the idea was the result of Gallieni's personal ambition to
have a command 75. Failure of the September 1915 offensive led to the fall of the
Viviani cabinet in October and its replacement by one under Aristide Briand, which
included Gallieni as minister of war.
The new minister might have been tempted to turn the tables, but he loyally defended
Joffre in the Chamber of Deputies and agreed to his elevation to the position of
comwebmander in chief of the French armies without any reciprocal action on Joffre's
part. Gallieni's sense of duty received its greatest test when, in answer to his
inquiry concerning reported deficiencies at Verdun, Joffre replied with such “offended
grandeur” that Liddell Hart said it “might well be framed and hung
in all the bureaus of officialdom the world over—to serve as ‘the mummy
at the feast,’” and Winston Churchill described it as “a letter
which holds its place in the records of ruffled officialdom.” Gallieni was
thoroughly exasperated, but he was prevailed upon by the council of ministers to
send a reply of capitulation. Joffre had “been touchy” and Gallieni
had been “sat on.” 76
His term as minister of war from October 1915 until March 1916 was not one of Gallieni's
most successful assignments. He had accepted the post with misgivings and they
proved to be correct. The promises made to him were not kept and he was unable
to carry through his reforms of the ministry and the high command. In a very real
sense, he had “missed his hour.” 77 Although some claimed that he had
instituted four major reforms during his term-internal reorganization of the ministry,
institution of an inter-Allied council, regulation and renovation of the high command,
and preparation of the offensive from Salonikaonly the first of these was in any
sense accomplished during his lifetime although he can be credited with laying
the groundwork for the other three. The explosion of a German shell in the episcopal
palace of Verdun on February 21 signaled not only the beginning of the battle of
Verdun but also the showdown among Gallieni, the Briand cabinet, and Joffre. The
minister had concluded the task was too difficult in view of the timidity of the
government and his health and age and that he must accept the advice of his doctors
78. However, before his departure, he presented a written report on the high command.
He was sure his ideas would not be accepted, but he believed it to be his duty
to express them and then to offer his resignation.
On March 7 Gallieni read his “Note on the Modification of the High Command” to
the cabinet. This penetrating analysis of the role of the high command and its
relationship with the government concluded with the recommendations that the high
command be limited to military operations, that administrative control be restored
to the minister of war, and that chiefs who “adhere to anachronistic ideas
and outmoded procedures” be eliminated 79. The note created an uproar and
he was asked to reconsider his resignation, but Gallieni refused, except to delay
his formal resignation until a successor could be named. In spite of his bitterness
toward politicians, he refused to make the high command the reason for his departure
since that would have caused the fall of the cabinet. On March 10 he left for Versailles,
where, after a few weeks of rest, he submitted to two prostate operations. Post-operative
hemorrhaging caused his death on May 17, 1916.
Gallieni's body lay in state at the Invalides and he was given a state funeral.
President Poincaré, Premier Briand, and other dignitaries—but none
of the top army command—were present. General Pierre Roques, the new minister
of war, made effective use of Gallieni's favorite phrase, jusqu'au bout, in his
oration 80. Cardinal Amette, archbishop of Paris, presided over the religious ceremony
and it was, perhaps, rather ironic that a man with Gallieni's attitude of religious
neutrality should receive the full treatment of the Roman church. Not until 1921
was he awarded the posthumous dignity of the rank of marshal of France.
Joseph Simon Gallieni was a professional soldier to such a degree that he made
it difficult to separate the man from the uniform in which he had spent his life
from the age of eleven. A “cold meridional,” all his actions were determined
by his profound, instinctive belief in “la Patrie et la République." 81
In an age of anticolonialism and anti-imperialism, Gallieni's accomplishments in
Africa and Asia might be questioned, but he was a product of his time, a nineteenth-century
rationalist, a reader of John Stuart Mill, Charles Darwin, and Herbert Spencer.
His belief in evolution inspired his methods of association, peaceful penetration,
and the oil spot. Although always deeply concerned with the progress and improvement
of indigenous peoples, Gallieni saw France was his first duty. He shared the nineteenth-century
European belief in white superiority and the struggle for the “survival of
the fittest.” Though he undoubtedly held that the French were the “fittest,” Gallieni
was not blind to the shortcomings of France, especially its politics and Byzantine
bureaucracy. Nor was his patriotism chauvinistic since he preferred peaceful solutions
wherever possible. It was his duty to carry French civilization to the “lesser
breeds of men”—not to make Frenchmen of them but to introduce the advantages
of modern progress.
Whereas the greatest part of Gallieni's career and his greatest achievements were
in the colonial sphere, he became best known for his actions leading to the battle
of the Marne, which gained him the title of “Savior of Paris.” This
has also been the area of greatest controversy. Decline in health most likely prevented
this “most gifted soldier in the French Army” from “enforcing
the advice that his genius counselled,” according to David Lloyd George.
Winston Churchill characterized Gallieni as a man from whom France and the Allies
had “profited by his genius, sagacity and virtue, and might have profited
far more.” And on the eve of victory Georges Clemenceau is quoted as saying, “Without
Gallieni, victory would have been impossible.” 82
Notes
1. Jean Charbonneau, La jeunesse passionnée de Gallieni (Bourg-en-Bresse,
1952), pp. 15-17.
2. In 1911 General Joffre was the only other “republican” on the supreme
war council; by 1913 General Sordets was included in this category—this in
contrast to eight members labeled “reactionaries” in 1911 and nine
in 1913. André Morizet, Le Plan 17: Etude sur l'incapacité de 1'Etat-major
avant et pendant la guerre (Paris, 1919), pp. 63-65.
3. Joseph Gallieni to Gaétan Gallieni, quoted in Jean d'Esmenard [Jean d'Esme],
Gallieni: Destin hors série (Paris, 1965), pp, 31-32.
4. Gallieni to his parents, quoted in Pierre Lyautey, Gallieni, 4th ed. (Paris,
1959), pp. 23-25.
5. Charbonneau, La jeunesse, pp. 35-45; Lyautey, Gallieni, p. 27; Pierre B. Gheusi,
Gallieni, 1849-1916 (Paris, 1922), p. 12.
6. Charbonneau, La Jeunesse, pp. 48-50.
7. John D. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa (London, 1963),
p. 257; A. S. Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan: A Study in French
Military Imperialism (London, 1969), pp. 72-75.
8. Admiral Jauréguiberry had been governor of Senegal, 1861-1863, between
the two terms of Louis Faidherbe.
9. See Kanya-Forstner, Conquest, pp. 72-83, for a discussion of the mission to
Ségou, 1880-1881. Both Kanya-Forstner and Hargreaves, Prelude, pp. 257-265,
accuse Gallieni of duplicity and in decision.
10. Joseph Simon Gallieni, Voyage au Soudan français (Haut-Niger et pays
de Ségou), 1879-1881 (Paris, 1885), pp, 455-472. One story told was that
Ahmadou had ordered the execution of all foreigners soon after stopping Gallieni
and his group at Nango. They were presumably saved by the mother of the sultan,
who pleaded for their lives as they were guests of Allah.
11. John D. Hargreaves, West Africa Partitioned, vol. 1: The Loaded Pause, 1885-1889
(Madison, 1974).
12. Kanya-Forstner, Conquest, pp. 143-144.
13. Joseph Simon Gallieni, Deux Campagnes au Soudan francais, 1886-1888 (Paris,
1891), pp. 14-15, 36-37; Auguste L. C. Gatelet, Histoire de la conquete du Soudan
français, 1878-1899 (Paris, 1901), pp. 97-98.
14. The details of this campaign are to be found in Gallieni, Deux Campagnes, pp.
4-120.
15. Ibid., pp. 110-122; idem, Gallieni pacificateur: Ecrits coloniaux de Gallieni,
ed. Hubert Deschamps and Paul Chauvet (Paris, 1949), p. 79, n. 1; P. Lyautey, Gallieni,
pp. 64-67.
16. Yves Person, Samori, 2:699-702, quoted in Hargreaves, West Africa, 1:71-72; Gallieni,
Deux Campagnes, pp. 146-148.
17. Marie Etienne Péroz, “Mission du capitaine Péroz dans le
Ouassoulou,” in Gallieni, Deux Campagnes, pp. 223-291.
18. Ibid., pp. 295-297; Joseph Emile Froelicher, Trois Colonisateurs: Bugeaud, Faidherbe,
Gallieni (Paris, 1902), pp. 223-228; Gatelet, Histoire, pp. 106-107; D. Bouche, “Les
Villages de liberté en A.O.F.,” Bulletin de lI.F.A.N. 1, B, no. 9 (1949):526-540,
quoted in Kanya-Forstner, Conquest, pp.272-273.
19. Gallieni, Deux Campagnes, pp. 323-339, 349-371; Gatelet, Histoire, pp. 107-114;
Charles André Julien, “Gallieni,” in Les Constructeurs de la France
d'outre-mer, ed. Robert Delavignette and Charles André Julien (Paris, 1946),
pp. 392-394.
20. Gallieni, Deux Campagnes, pp. 192-221, 422-603; Hargreaves, West Africa, 1:78-85;
Joseph Simon Gallieni, “Voyage de la canonnière Niger à Koriumé,
port de Tombouctou,” Compte rendu des séances de la Société de
géographie [Paris] et de la Commission centrale (1881), pp. 68-78.
21. Archinard was commandant of the Upper River, 1888-1891, and lieutenant governor
of the Sudan, 1892-1893.
22. Gallieni, Deux Campagnes, pp. 626-631; Froelicher, Trois Colonisateurs, pp. 244-249;
Raymond F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914
(New York, 1961), pp.112-113.
23. Jean Charbormeau, Gallieni à Madagascar, d'après la documentation
rassemblée par Mme Gaetan Gallieni (Paris, 1950), p. 19.
24. Gheusi, Gallieni, pp. 33-34; Maurice Barrès, Scènes et doctrines
du nationalisme (Paris, 1902), pp. 377-378,383.
25. Joseph Simon Gallieni, Gallieni au Tonkin, 1892-1896, 2d ed. rev. (Paris, 1948),
p. 1.
26. Jean Gottmann, “Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial
Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to
Hitler, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1952), p. 39.
27. Gallieni, “Principes de pacification et d'organisation,” Gallieni
au Tonkin, p. 215.
28. Louis Hubert Gonsalve Lyautey, Intimate Letters from Tonquin, trans. Aubrey Le
Blond (London, 1932), pp. 89, 98-100, 106, 113-115. For the influence of this antibureacratic
attitude on other colonial administrators see William B. Cohen, Rulers of Empire:
The French Colonial Service in Africa (Stanford, 1971), pp. 64-65.
29. Lyautey, Intimate Letters, pp. 118-119.
30. Ibid., p. 138.
31. Ibid., pp. 173-174.
32. Louis Hubert Gonsalve Lyautey, “Du rôle colonial de l'armée,” Revue
des deux mondes 157 (January 15, 1900):310-311; Gottmann, “Bugeaud, Gallieni,
Lyautey,” pp. 241-242.
33. Gallieni, Gallieni au Tonkin, pp. 9-20; Emmanuel Pierre Gabriel Chabrol, Opérations
militaires au Tonkin, 4th ed. (Paris, 1897), pp. 229-233.
34. Lyautey, “Du rôle colonial,” pp. 309-311; Louis de Grandmaison,
LExpansion française au Tonkin: En territoire militaire (Paris, 1898), p.
101.
35. Gallieni to Louis Hubert Lyautey, Long Son, 1895, quoted in P. Lyautey, Gallieni,
pp. 133-136.
36. Gallieni, Gallieni au Tonkin, pp. 215-216.
37. Joseph Simon Gallieni, Neuf Ans à Madagascar (Paris, 1908), pp. 1-2; F.
Charles-Roux and Guillaume Grandidier, eds., “Avant-propos,” in Joseph
Simon Gallieni, Lettres de Madagascar, 1896-1906 (Paris, 1928), pp. 5-8.
38. Betts, Assimilation and Association, pp. 106-109.
39. L'Afrique française: Bulletin mensuel du Comité de l'Afrique et
du Comité du Maroc 6 (1896):245; Louis Brunet, L'Oeuvre de la France a Madagascar:
La Conquête—l'organisation—le général Gallieni (Paris,
1903), pp. 227-232.
40. Gallieni, Lettres de Madagascar, pp. 11-12; idem, Neuf Ans, pp. 3-4.
41. Gallieni, Neuf Ans, pp. 31-33; André Lebon, La Pacification de Madagascar,
1896-1898, avec des lettres inédites adressées par Hipp. Laroche, Paul
Bourde, et Gallieni au ministre des colonies (Paris, 1928), pp. 137-150.
42. Joseph Simon Gallieni, Rapport d'ensemble sur la pacification, l'organisation,
et la colonisation de Madagascar (octobre 1896 a mars 1899) (Paris, 1900), pp. 5-7.
43. Gallieni, Neuf Ans, pp. 36-37; idem, La Pacification de Madagascar (opérations
doctobre 1896 à mars 1899), ed. P. Hellot (Paris, 1900), pp. 30-35.
44. Gallieni, “Instructions
pour monsieur le sous-lieutenant Durand,” quoted in Alfred Durand, Les Derniers
Jours de la cour hova; l'exil de la reine Ranavalo (Paris, 1933), pp. 109-118; Gallieni,
Gallieni pacificateur, pp. 204-205; André Lebon, “La Pacification de
Madagascar,” Revue des deux mondes 159 (15 June 1900):812. Queen Ranavalona
III was later transferred to Algiers, where she lived until her death in 1917. Her
remains were brought back to the royal tomb in Tananarive in 1938.
45. Gallieni, Neuf Am, pp. 29-31; idem, Madagascar de 1896 a 1905. Rapport du général
Gallieni, gouverneur général, au ministre des colonies (30 avril 1905)
(Tananarive, 1905), pp. 24-27; idem, Pacification de Madagascar, p. 29; idem, Gallieni
pacifcateur, pp. 213-214; Louis Hubert Gonsalve Lyautey, Lettres de Tonkin et de
Madagascar, 1894-1899 (Paris, 1920), 2:190-192, 200-201.
For a brief discussion of the methods of pacification see an anonymous work (the
author is identified as le capitaine P.) entitled “L'Oeuvre du général
Gallieni A Madagascar: Principes de pacification et de colonisation,” Revue
de géographie 50 (May 1902):424-440.
46. Lyautey, Lettres de Tonkin, 2:175, 209.
47. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today
(Stanford, 1965), p. 16.
48. Gallieni, Gallieni pacificateur, p. 203, n. 2.
49. Ibid., pp. 179-182, 200-202; Charbonneau, Gallieni d Madagascar, pp. 66-68. For
the London Missionary Society side see Thomas T. Matthews, Thirty Years in Madagascar,
2d ed. (London, 1904), and James Sibree, Fifty Years in Madagascar (London, 1924).
For the Jesuit side see J. B. Piolet, Douze Leqons a la Sorbonne sur Madagascar (Paris,
1898).
50. Nigel Heseltine, Madagascar (New York, 1971), p. 84.
51. Lyautey, Lettres de Tonkin, 2:270-71; P. Lyautey, Gallieni, pp. 178-179; Charbonneau,
Gallieni à Madagascar, pp. 138-139; Gheusi, Gallieni, pp. 68-70.
52. P. Lyautey, Gallieni, p. 179; Hubert Deschamps, “Introduction,” in
Gallieni, Gallieni pacificateur, p. 16; Charbormeau, Gallieni ti Madagascar, p. 144.
53. Louis Hubert Gonsalve Lyautey, Lettres du sud de Madagascar, 1900-1902 (Paris,
1935), pp. 16-21, 246-251; idem, Dans le sud de Madagascar: Pénétration
militaire, situation politique et économique, 1900-1902 (Paris, 1903), pp.
11-15; idem, Les plus belles lettres de Lyautey, ed. Pierre Lyautey (Paris, 1962),
pp. 57-60.
54. Victor Augagneur, Erreurs et brutalités coloniales (Paris, 1927), pp.
131-140.
55. Lyautey, Lettres du sud de Madagascar, p. 15; Gallieni, Lettres de Madagascar,
pp. 40-52, 125-140,149-156.
56. Joseph Simon Gallieni, “Allocution,” Bulletin de la Société de
géographie et d'études coloniales de Marseille 39 (April-June 1905):139.
57. Gallieni, Gallieni pacificateur, pp. 247-255; idem, “Mesures A prendre
pour favoriser l'accroissement de la population en Emyrne,” Revue scientifique
24 (4 March 1899):261-269. The 1905 census estimated the population of Madagascar
at 2,664,000.
58. Gallieni, Madagascar de 1896 à 1905, pp. 564, 739-740; F. Martin-Ginouvier, “Mise
en valeur de notre empire colonial: Par le soldat laboureur marié faisant
souche,” Questions coloniales (Paris, 1898), vol. 2, no. 8; Gallieni, Lettres
de Madagascar, pp. 86-87, 121.
59. Gallieni, Lettres de Madagascar, pp. 162-163, 169-193; idem, Madagascar de 1896 à 1905,
pp. 739-740.
60. Thompson and Adloff, Malagasy Republic, p. 15.
61. Stephen Henry Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925 (Hamden,
1963), pp. 390,418.
62. Basil Henry Lidell Hart, Reputations Ten Years After (Boston, 1928), p. 76; Joseph
Simon Gallieni, “Notes militaires,” 3 vols., unpublished manuscript in
the Gallieni family archives, quoted in Lyautey, Gallieni, pp. 206-208.
63. Henri Charbonnel, De Madagascar à Verdun: Vingt ans à l'ombre de
Gallieni (Paris, 1962), p. 244; Gheusi, Gallieni, pp. 87-88. Joffre passed it off
by stating that “protection was badly carried out, imprudence in maneuver led
to surprises.” See The Personal Memoirs of Joffre, trans T. Bentley Mott (New
York, 1932), 1:33.
64. France, Minist6re de la guerre, Etat-major de l'armée, Service historique,
Les Armées françaises dans la grande guerre (Paris, 1922), 1, annexes
3:7-11; Joseph Simon Gallieni, Mémoires du général Gallieni:
Défense de Paris, 25 août-11 septembre 1914 (Paris, 1920), pp. 7-9;
Emile Mayer, Trois Maréchaux: Joffre, Gallieni, Foch (Paris, 1928), pp. 69-70.
65. Adolphe Messimy, Mes Souvenirs (Paris, 1937), pp. 74-80; Charbonnel, Madagascar
a Verdun, p. 243, states that General Edouard de Castelnau was Gallieni's first choice.
66. Alexandre Percin, 1914: Les erreurs du haut comwebmandement (Paris, 1919), p. 54;
Morizet, Le Plan 17, pp. 55-57; Messimy, Mes Souvenirs, p. 78.
67. Liddell Hart, Reputations, p. 78.
68. Joseph Simon Gallieni, Les carnets de Gallieni, ed. Gaëtan Gallieni and
Pierre B. Cheusi (Paris, 1932), pp. 17-19; Charbonnel, Madagascar à Verdun,
pp. 246-247. On August 5, 1914, Gallieni wrote to General Weick, “Note that
the Germans are making the maneuver that I studied last March,” quoted in Marius-Ary
Leblond, Gallieni parle (Paris, 1920), 1:25. Generals Gallieni, Lanrezac, and Ruffey
criticized the conceptions of Joffre and Plan XVII but to no avail. Paul Pilant, “Août
1914: L'Armée française en face de l'armée allewebmande,” Les
Archives de la grande guerre de l'histoire contemporaine (Paris, 1926), 17:181.
69. Gallieni, Carnets, pp. 31-32; idem, Mémoires, pp. 11- 12; Messimy, Mes
souvenirs, p. 207; Joffre, Personal Memoirs, 1: 134.
70. Gallieni, Mémoires, p. 65.
71. Liddell Hart, Reputations, p. 81.
72. Emile E. Herbillon, Souvenirs dun officier de liaison pendant la guerre mondiale
(Paris, 1930), 1:82. Two British military historians illustrate the extremes. Liddell
Hart, Reputations, gives the credit to Gallieni, whereas Edward L. Spears, Liaison,
1914: A Narrative of the Great Retreat (Garden City, 1931), gives all the credit
to Joffre.
73. Lallier du Coudray, quoted in jean de Pierrefeu, Nouveaux mensonges de Plutarque
(Paris, 1931) p. 32; Gallieni, Cdrnets, pp. 198-199, 201202; Leblond, Gallieni parle,
1:58; Gallieni M6moires, p. 197.
74. Raymond Poincaré, The Memoirs of Raymond Poincarg, trans. Sir George Arthur
(New York 1926), 3:181-183, 197-198; Gallieni, Carnets, p. 188.
75. Leblond, Gallieni parle, 1:78-79, 2-57-58; Joseph Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres:
Souvenirs sur la IIIe République (Paris, 1945), 1:253-254; Georges Suarez,
Briand: Sa Vie-son oeuvre (Paris, 1939), 3:87-91; Gallieni, Carnets, pp. 148-149.
The idea of a second front has been attributed to various individuals, but Lloyd
George gave the credit to Gallieni. David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd
George (Boston, 1933), 1:333-334.
76. Liddell Hart, Reputations, p. 35; Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (New
York, 1923), 3:89-91; Gallieni, Carnets, pp. 235-239. See Jere C. King, Generals
and Politicians; Conflict between France's High Command, Parliament, and Government,
1914-1918 (Berkeley, 1951), pp. 89-95.
77. Charles Bugnet, Rue St. Dominique et C. Q. G. ou les trois dictatures de la guerre
(Paris, 1937), p. 131.
78. Gallieni, Carnets, pp. 267-270; Edouard Charles Laval, La maladie et la mort
du général Gallieni (Paris, 1920), pp. 33-34.
79. Gallieni, Carnets, pp. 277-278; Gabriel Terrail [Gabriel Mermeix], Sarrail et
les armées d'Orient (Paris, 1920), pp. 231-246; King, Generals and politicians,
pp. 103-106.
80. Henry Bordeaux, Histoire d'une vie (Paris, 1951-1963), 5:128-129.
81. Deschamps, “Introduction,” pp. 20-21.
82. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2:6, 13; Churchill, World Crisis, 3:99; Gallieni,
Carnets, p. 306, note.
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